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Abstract
Educators have daily experience with how students' emotional states influence
their behaviors and levels of motivation. What is more poorly understood and even
counterintuitive in effect is the subtler role of emotion in the role of metacognitive
monitoring in the form of learning belief development. The research driving current
understanding in this area is limited and fragmented across disciplines. The purpose of
the current quantitative, cross-sectional study was to contribute to our understanding of
the role that emotion plays in metacognitive monitoring. The study used self-report
measures given before and after a video-based learning task. Metrics included measures
of emotional state, intelligence, and self-reported metacognitive monitoring in the form
of self-efficacy and post-assessment performance beliefs. The sample consisted of 104
college students from the University of New Mexico attending one of several sessions
held during the spring semester. Participants completed the assessments while watching
two videos, one a presentation on positive psychology and the other a philosophy lecture
on logical fallacies. Demographic and environmental details were examined as
intervening variables. Results of multiple regression analysis suggest a relationship
between emotion and beliefs formed during metacognitive monitoring. Positive emotions
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tended to be associated with overestimation of ability and performance while negative
emotions showed a more complex influence with type of negative emotion determining
the strength and direction of effect. Findings suggest these effects are independent of
environmental or demographic factors and are congruent with the literature on the
influence of emotions on cognition and metacognitive beliefs. Developing a better
understanding of the influence of emotion on metacognitive processes may help
educators take steps to improve students' self-assessments and researchers' understanding
of hot cognition.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Anyone who has taught in a classroom has experienced an array of effects arising
from their own emotions and those of their students. Beyond the interplay of studentteacher emotional states, the underlying mood can create an atmosphere wherein each
day is a painful, forced march or a celebrated exploration of ideas and vigorous
conversation. When painted with large brushstrokes, the effects of emotions in the
classroom are common memes to which any teacher will relate and share stories. Yet,
accessing a more granular view of the influence of a student's emotions and the beliefs
they form about their learning are not well known to educators and are still under
consideration by researchers.
Student behavior and cognitive processes are modeled by diverse, even competing
constructs. While human behavior is too complex to reliably predict the behavior of any
single individual, certain patterns generally hold true for groups of learners. Being
motivated and goal-directed is associated with success, as are having good study habits,
persistence, and strong social support. However, the mechanisms that drive motivation
and the choices that impact learning are still much debated.
Background
Emotion. The experience and implications of emotions have long been a popular
topic within psychology, and it has been established as playing a critical role in several
domains of the human experience (Gardiner, Metcalf, & Beebe-Center, 1937; James,
1884). The nature of emotion and its role in cognitive processing has traditionally been
subject to much debate, but its role has become more secure as a separate but influential
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process in cognition (Damasio, 2000; LeDoux, 2000). Researchers using brain scanning
technology, such as fMRI, have been able to continuously reveal more of the structural
relationship of the brain to associated emotional states, but this type of research cannot
yet directly reveal the subtler effects of emotion on psychological constructs, such as how
future recall of an event will be altered by the emotions that were experienced at the time
it was encoded.
Everyone has experience with how intense emotions such as anger can influence
their thinking or experience of an event, but the subtler effects, such as on long-term
memory, are still under study (LeBlanc, McConnell, & Monteiro, 2015). Even more so,
secondary implications for behavior are less understood. An example is its influence on
some physical actions, such as performance during sporting events (McCarthy, 2011).
Researchers have even demonstrated a implications for the role of emotions in health
outcomes (Cappellen, Rice, Catalino, & Fredrickson, 2018; Richman et al., 2005).
Emotion is a key component of emerging theories of behavior, such as the recent
development of the field of positive psychology. Positive psychology is concerned with
answering the question “what causes a human being to flourish?” (Seligman &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). Positive psychology theory holds that emotions influence wellbeing by impacting not only physical heath, but mental and social well-being as well.
Further, positive psychology research suggests there is a strong correlation between
positivity of emotion and level of motivation and task engagement (Fredrickson, 2001;
Pajares, 2001; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014).
Metacognition. Schraw (1998) identified knowledge about knowledge, or
metacognition, as having two distinguishable features: knowledge of cognition and

3
regulation of cognition. Knowledge about one's knowing and ability are components of
metacognitive knowledge, while knowledge of how best to use one’s ability and direct
learning is metacognitive regulation. Metacognition research has demonstrated its direct
impact on learning by informing a learner about their current state of learning and how
best to self-direct their own learning behaviors (T.O. Nelson & Narens, 1994; Schraw,
1998).
Models of metacognition do not always agree on its components or mechanisms
for influencing behavior (Schraw, 1998; Shimamura, 2008). While monitoring may not
appear prominently in all theories and assemblies of a metacognitive construct, it is an
inescapable component of the mechanisms driving metacognition (Shimamura, 2008).
Nelson and Narens (1994) identified metacognitive monitoring (MM) and its
neurological process as the inference and translation of objective information from the
posterior cortex to a meta level of thought in the prefrontal cortex. The interpretation of
objective information into more subjective meta level interpretations of knowledge is the
MM of interest in the current study as a potential vector of influence by emotional states
that then result in inaccurate metacognitive appraisals.
Problem Statement
The ubiquitous interest in emotion has not resolved the uncertainty that has arisen
from their study or the inconsistency in the conclusions about their roles in cognition.
Studies of emotion provide several challenges, including the difficulties that come from
any self-assessment, differences in how emotion is defined, and overlap with congruent
constructs such as affect and mood. However, the greatest problems that occur in regard
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to emotion and metacognition are not methodology or construct definition, but rather the
overall lack of salient research informing theory and practice.
A student’s level of accuracy with MM has direct implications for learning
outcomes. If the student is unable to accurately self-monitor their abilities and their
learning progress, they cannot effectively implement metacognitive strategies or
otherwise exert effective control over their own learning progress (Nietfeld, Cao, &
Osborne, 2005). Metacognitive monitoring is central to a student’s ability to self-regulate
their own learning processes (Butler & Winne, 1995). However, MM is often highly
inaccurate (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987). Previous research into the cognitive processes
contributing to MM has focused on top-down processing (Thomas O. Nelson & Narens,
1990).
Current models of metacognition focus on what an individual knows about the
difficulty of a task, their ability, and strategies for learning. What is less clear is how
emotions influence the development of beliefs that play a central role in metacognitive
monitoring. It seems counterintuitive studies of metacognition and behavior would
neglect belief or treat it as a separate component of metacognitive regulation. The
importance of this relationship is further punctuated by the tenacity of beliefs and the
reciprocal relationship implied by the role of cognition on emotion.
Given the evidence that the physiological effects of emotion directly influence the
assessment of the self and circumstances (Bandura, 1993; Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop,
1996), the role of emotion appears to be an underexplored topic for metacognition.
Emotions have multiple opportunities to interact with cognitive processes that influence
metacognition, including influencing the beliefs that inform and result from the
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metacognitive process. The number of potential interactions with differences both within
individuals and environments hint at what may be a substantial gap in the literature.
The largely unaccounted-for effect of emotion in the MM literature limits the
ability to accurately model metacognition as a robust construct. The current literature
acknowledges emotion is an inseparable component of cognitive processes; however, few
studies have been done to examine how emotion during a learning experience influences
the MM progress and the resulting feelings the individual holds on their level of ability or
self-efficacy (Damasio, 2000). This implies a core component of metacognitive theory,
MM, is still poorly understood. The lack of literature limits understanding, but the extent
of absence of conclusive, replicable findings appears to be an indicator that development
and refinement of metacognitive theory has been impeded.
Purpose of the Study
Despite the increase in research and interest in the role of emotion in cognition
and learning, many questions remain. Metacognitive monitoring has a growing body of
literature, but these studies are not always in agreement and may not be arriving at the
most parsimonious explanation of observed outcomes. The current study helps to clarify
outcomes from previous studies, and it is among the first to examine an entirely new line
of research: MM as a hot cognition process.
Understanding the influence of emotion in this context is important because
effective interventions already exist for mitigating emotional influence in cognitive
processes (Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009; Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; Siemer &
Reisenzein, 1998). Evidence of a significant role of emotion in MM needs to be
established before such interventions can be justified; therefore, a clear need exists for the
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research within the current study. The current study provides initial evidence to drive
future research and hints at the importance of emotion as a consideration during the
learning process.
The purpose of this study is to address a weakness in the literature on
metacognition by examining the role of emotions in the beliefs associated with MM. Due
to scarce literature on the topic, a more exploratory approach was taken to explore the
relationship through a quantitative, cross-sectional study of emotions and beliefs during a
learning task. The goal was to widely approach bridging the gap and to serve as an initial
exploration to inform future research on the topic. The current study is among the first to
investigate the role of bottom-up, emotion-driven MM.
Metacognitive monitoring is examined by exploring three beliefs that serve as
proxies, or more easily measured dimension of the MM process. Self-report on these
belief states serve as the dependent variables: self-efficacy belief (SEB), feeling of
knowing (FOK), and retrospective confidence judgments (RCJ). Emotion is the
independent variable, examined with a focus on the dimensions of valence (positive and
negative) and arousal. The current study also seeks to examine intervening variables that
may be influencing any main effects. The intervening variables of interest are
demographics, emotion monitoring, intelligence, and environmental influence. The study
used a video-based learning task given amidst a battery of self-report and assessment
measures.
Definition of Key Terms
Arousal. The level of intensity of emotion; the level of psychological
stimulation.
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Distress Tolerance. Distress Tolerance is the meta-emotional capacity to resist
aversive psychological states. It is a multifaceted construct composed of dealing with
difficult emotions through: (1) tolerance; (2) acceptance; (3) prevention of cognitive
disruption; and (4) regulation of behaviors in relation to emotional state (Simons &
Gaher, 2005; Zvolensky, Vujanovic, Bernstein, & Leyro, 2010).
Environment. For this study, environment is the culmination of the experience
driven by the sensory ecology of the location where the participants completed the study,
time and date of data collection, and order in which learning material was provided.
There were two locations to which participants were apportioned: A newer, well-lit,
comfortable classroom and a starker, basement lab room.
Emotion. Emotion is still poorly defined in the literature, in part due to
competing theories as to the nature of emotion, the difficulty in defining the edges
between emotions and the more subtle distinctions such as between emotion and affect
(Gendron, 2010). For the current study, emotion is defined in the most general terms as a
physiological state associated with lower brain functions distinct from purely logical
reasoning experienced as subjective feelings that one is or can become aware of
experiencing.
Intelligence. Intelligence is the ability to use logic and complex thinking to solve
novel problems; this definition most closely aligns to the concept of fluid intelligence
more than a general concept of intelligence (Cattell, 1971; Humphreys, 1979).
Learning Beliefs. Beliefs are a state or conclusion that is acted upon or held in
faith. The current study operationalizes learning beliefs as conclusions regarding
predicted ability and faith in the level of understanding achieved. For pre-learning beliefs
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in ability, self-efficacy is used. For confidence conclusions post assessment FOK and
RCJ are used. This study uses learning beliefs as the dimension of metacognitive
monitoring that can be accessed through participant self-evaluations.
Self-efficacy belief (SEB). Self-efficacy is the domain-specific belief in one’s
ability to learn or perform tasks within that domain (Bandura, 1977).
Feeling of knowing (FOK). Feeling of knowing is a subjective belief of one’s
level of knowledge that is not informed by sufficient feedback to make an objective
decision (Koriat, 1997).
Reflective confidence judgment (RCJ). Reflective confidence judgment is a postlearning belief of one’s knowledge informed by an external measure but lacking
sufficient information to make an objective judgment (Koriat, 1997).
Metacognition. Metacognition is the knowledge and thoughts about one’s own
thinking, knowledge, and learning (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2008; Schraw, 1998).
Metacognitive monitoring (MM). Metacognitive monitoring is the process of
assembling objective information into a metacognitive schema, measured as a confidence
judgment on learning performance (Schraw, 2009; Shimamura, 2008).
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Chapter II
Literature Review
Current formal, cognitive models are inherently limited due to their inability to
account for the role of emotion in appraisal processes (Forstmann, Wagenmakers,
Eichele, Brown, & Serences, 2011; Winocur, Moscovitch, & Bontempi, 2010). The
literature acknowledges emotion is an inseparable component of cognitive processes;
however, few studies examine how emotion during learning influences MM, specifically
in the form of learning beliefs. Of interest in this study are the learning beliefs
operationalized as self-efficacy belief (SEB), feeling of knowing (FOK), and
retrospective confidence judgments (RCJ). Understanding the influence of emotion on
learning beliefs is important because if certain emotions are negatively impacting
student’s metacognitive monitoring through poor judgments and counterproductive
learning beliefs, steps can be taken to ameliorate those effects. Established interventions,
such as mindfulness, can help students become more aware of how they are feeling and
learn metacognitive strategies for better informing their learning beliefs. However,
before such intervention can be justified, evidence of a significant role of emotion in the
self-assessed beliefs about learning needs to be established.
Emotional States
Ekkekakis (2009) devised a three-step process for choosing a measure of emotion:
(1) determine the appropriate construct and dimensions of study, including emotion,
mood and core affect; (2) choose the theoretical model within the construct; and (3)
consider the psychometric properties of each assessment. The current study does not
examine all dimensions of emotion but focuses on positive emotion (PE) and negative
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emotion (NE). This approach is congruent with Russell’s (1980) model of core
emotional space having the two orthogonal factors of valence and activation. Under this
model, all emotional states can be placed within varying degrees of positive or negative
emotion (valence) and the extent of arousal level (activation). It is generally held that
emotion is too complex to capture in self-report; therefore, measures of affect are
typically used as a proxy for emotional states (Russell, 2003).
Mood. The construct of mood is an individual’s persistent emotion state whose
source is difficult to identify. Mood states may include an individual’s default state of
emotion arising from the sum of all ongoing experience and environmental inputs (Frijda,
2009), or they may be a temporary but persistent emotional state whose source is either
vague or temporally remote (Beedie, Terry, & Lane, 2005). Examples of mood include
an extended period of time where an individual was depressed after a particularly
difficult week, or it may be an ongoing default state of irritability for an author who has
faced continual rejection for publications.
Emotion. Russell and Barrett (1999) defined emotion as a dynamic system of
events occurring in relation to a specific source. The source is specific and identifiable,
but with little limitation to what might cause the genesis. The components they identified
for an emotion response is: (1) core affect; (2) observable behavior congruent with core
affect; (3) a significant level of focus on the source of the response; (4) cognitive
appraisal of the stimuli; (5) attributing the current affective response to the event; (6)
recognition and experience of the emotion itself; and (7) neural and physiological
changes congruent with the emotion. Within this paradigm, the fourth step is the critical
differentiating component (Russell & Barrett, 1999).
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Affect. If emotion requires appraisal, affect is then the immediate response to
stimuli that occurs without reflection (Russell & Barrett, 1999). As we are constantly
under the influence of external and internal stimuli, we are constantly experiencing affect
of varying degrees (Ekkekakis, 2009). Affect is therefore differentiable from, but can be
a component of, emotion and mood. For example, the sight of a spider might elicit fear
as an affective response that evolves into fear and disgust as the individual considers the
presence of the spider.
Emotion in the Current Study. Emotion is a challenging construct. It does not
have a single, widely accepted definition. It can be difficult to distinguish between its
edges and states. If a construct cannot be decomposed into discrete, objective
components and a universal definition is not forthcoming, there is a temptation to rely on
intuition as the coagulant for manifesting agreement. For the current study, empirical
availability for emotional states is gained through administering established self-report
assessments of emotion.
Emotion Induction
There are several experimental methods for the induction of an emotional state,
but few have been as validated across disciplines as a five-minute writing exercise
wherein participants are asked to write about an experience that elicited the target
emotion (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Inductions that use music, videos, or faces have been
used successfully but lack the consistency of a writing induction. This is attributed, at
least in part, to differences in appraisal and interpretation of the medium being presented.
For example, a face that one person may find to be hostile and angry may appear
humorous and exaggerated to another. However, inducing emotional states, especially

12
negative ones, can raise ethical concerns. With little evidence in the literature that
artificially induced emotional act equally to endogenous ones, induction was avoided in
the current study.
Emotion and Learning
There is a rich literature which supports the central and inseparable role of
emotion in cognitive processes (Damasio, 1994; Izard, 1993; Pessoa, 2008). Cognition
involves both top-down executive function and bottom-up emotional processing with
each playing a role in the monitoring of the other (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). It has
been a challenge for research to include emotion into cognitive models as a systems-level
understanding of the scope and range of possible effects is unknown; however,
researchers are revealing through a growing body of literature how emotion changes
executive functioning. Examples include research demonstrating a direct effect of
emotion on schema activation (Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996; Strack, Schwarz,
Bless, Kübler, & Wänke, 1993) and cognitive strategies in decision making (Fiedler &
Walther, 2004; Nadler, Rabi, & Minda, 2010; Zivot, Cohen, & Kapucu, 2013). Emotion
has further been associated with rapid, heuristic thought that could be correlated to the
feelings associated with learning beliefs, but that relationship is yet to be established
specific to learning beliefs (DeWall, Baumeister, & Masicampo, 2008; Phelps & Sharot,
2008).
When emotion has been examined in the context of learning, it has typically
centered on the appraisals that occur during learning that lead to emotional states or the
resultant, observable motivational or behavioral states that follow, typified by Perun
(2006).
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Metacognitive Monitoring
Student’s ability to objectively self-assess learning is plagued with challenges.
Despite the increased importance placed on self-evaluated learning, individuals'
knowledge of their own learning or learning outcome expectations tends to correlate
poorly with objective or standardized assessments (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, &
Kruger, 2003; Shell, Murphy, & Bruning, 1989). Students make errors in calibrating
their learning progress through such mechanisms as source errors, influence of prior
inaccurate information, and failure to identify when an effective strategy has improved
their learning (Salas, Minakata, & Kelemen, 2011; Schwartz & Efklides, 2012; van Loon,
de Bruin, van Gog, & van Merriënboer, 2013). If top-down cognitive processes are
limited in their influence on learning beliefs, the need to examine bottom-up emotional
processes becomes more salient.
Failure to accurately assess strengths, weaknesses, and misconceptions from a
learning experience can significant impact future progress. Students who overestimate
their development may decrease their time on task and effort in future studies (Dunning
et al., 2003; van Loon et al., 2013). Alternately, if a student believes they require greater
time to study than is actually necessary, they may engage in a detrimental practice of
overlearning (Langer & Imber, 1979). While individual learning experiences may not
suffer from minor miscalibrations, an ongoing pattern of repeatedly misjudging progress
may begin to impair academic progress. This condition is compounded by a frequent
deficiency in metacognitive strategies, even when the calibration is correct (McCabe,
2011).
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Korait (1997) identified three categories of cues used for MM used by learner:
intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic. Intrinsic cues are the most immediately salient
sensory experience of the presentation of material, such as number and quality of
illustrations. Extrinsic cues include the type of instructions given for study and the time
allotted for different tasks. The individual’s feelings of the material, the subjective
judgments on the ease of which material is recalled are called mnemonic cues. Heuristic
thinking is also the type of judgment most influenced by mood and emotional, bottom-up
processing (Forgas, 1995)
Among Koriat’s MM heuristics, learners tend to default to heuristics that
overemphasize the intrinsic rather than the more objective extrinsic factors while largely
failing to attend to the influence of mnemonic cues in their thinking (Koriat, 1997).
Incorrect judgment of learning is known to arise from specific temporal issues. Students
who practice for extended periods or on repeated occasions without significant gains tend
to undervalue their progress, as do students who assess after an extended delay from their
last study session (Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002; Pyc & Rawson, 2012).
Additionally, recent investigations into MM are increasingly turning toward perceiving
metacognitive strategies as being not only unconscious, but based on “noetic feelings”
that are used to inform conscious metacognitive choices (Koriat, 2000; Koriat & LevySadot, 2000). These findings provide specific evidence for knowledge of learning arising
largely from judgments based on aesthetic or emotional response.
A last key emotional component of knowledge of learning results from a
bottleneck effect that occurs when self-regulation and self-assessment must co-occur
(Dunning et al., 2003; Yeo & Neal, 2013). Such a limitation on resources for MM would
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indicate that an increase in emotional intensity and the need for emotion regulation
provide an additional pathway through which emotions can impact learning assessment.
This creates a temporal condition to MM. A student might assess their progress
differently if experiencing strong emotion as opposed to waiting until they have returned
to a more neutral emotional state.
Self-Efficacy Beliefs. The way an individual’s experiences, social interactions,
and motivations can be assembled into a multitude of constructs, with self-efficacy being
one of the most indelible for educators and educational psychologists due to its
persistence and popularity in the literature. Self-efficacy can be defined an individual’s
domain-specific beliefs in their performance capabilities (Bandura, 1977, 1993). The
construct is a belief based on the self-assessed performance for a specific task rather than
a broader global measure such as self-esteem and requires task specificity to be
accurately measured (Bandura, 1986; Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2003; Schunk & Pajares,
2002).
It should be noted that, perhaps paradoxically, a construct of general self-efficacy
has been proposed. Measures that rely on the construct report validation through
psychometric studies (Luszczynska, Scholz, & Schwarzer, 2005). However, the
definition of validity used in these studies tends to be limited to quantitative evaluations
such as factor analysis and reliability measures. Studies that measured correlation
between generalized self-efficacy and similar constructs such as self-esteem, locus of
control, and neuroticism found low discrimination due to overlap in constructs and
perhaps an unidentified higher-order construct (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002;
Tipton & Worthington, 1984). As the evidence supports discrimination between
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Bandura’s self-efficacy as a domain evaluation of skill and a general self-perception,
generalized self-efficacy is not applicable to the current study.
Self-efficacy, when measured as being content specific, is an important construct
in education as it is a direct predictor of learning behavior and education outcomes
(Multon, Brown, & Lent, 1991; Pajares, 1996; Shell et al., 1989). Pajares (1996)
describes it as the mechanism by which social and personal knowledge translate into
actions that drive learning or its avoidance. Higher self-efficacy beliefs (SEBs) result in
increased expectancy outcomes and are associated with both volume and intensity of
effort as demonstrated by: increased tenacity when faced with setback or difficulties;
active engagement with metacognitive strategies; self-regulatory behaviors; and
aspirations and goal setting (Bandura, 2010; Pintrich & de Groot, 1990; Schunk, 1985;
Zimmerman, 2000; Zimmerman, Bandura, & Martinez-Pons, 1992). Low self-efficacy
not only decreases desirable cognitive and motivational states, it can impart undesirable
effects such as avoidant behavior, rumination, and anxiety (Bandura, 2010; Pajares,
1996).
Bandura recognizes four sources of self-efficacy: (1) mastery experiences; (2)
vicarious social modeling; (3) social persuasion; and (4) misinterpretation of
physiological states (Bandura, 1977; 1993). Additional research has identified other
contributors, such as perceived task difficulty, locus of control, and learning environment
(Gist & Mitchell, 1992). These factors indirectly illustrate that self-efficacy is more than
a single impression, but an evolving belief formed through experience and interaction
with others. However, as experiences increase in number and salience, a more persistent
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SEB can form that begin to become self-reinforcing, coloring how additional experiences
are interpreted and recalled (Gist & Mitchell, 1992; Pajares, 1996).
Bandura tends to not focus on emotion, even though he recognizes physiological
arousal is a key contributing factor. When he does investigate the influence of emotion,
it tends to only be in the context of stress or a negative emotion contributing to a
physiological response that is observed and misinterpreted as a lack of ability by the
learner (Bandura, 1993). Other research of emotion with self-efficacy tends to focus on
self-efficacy as a predictor of emotion rather than as an outcome of the emotion during
formation of the self-efficacy beliefs or as low self-efficacy and anxiety being a looping
cycle of effect (Bandura, 1977; Pajares, 1996).
The research on self-efficacy appears to conform to research on emotion and
cognition, such as mood congruent judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), but
comprehensive evidence or measures of magnitude of different emotions on self-efficacy
are lacking. Kavanagh & Bower (1985) provided evidence that positive emotional states
increased self-efficacy while negative emotions decreased them in one of the only studies
attempting to access the role of emotion on self-efficacy. There are several criticisms
available to this work that limit its generalizability. They including the lack of
discrimination between different positive and negative emotions as well as possible
implications from the emotions states being hypnotically induced rather than being those
endogenous to the learning environment and domain. Further, the measure of selfefficacy lacked domain specificity and may have been more strongly correlated with selfconfidence than self-efficacy as applied to any specific domain.
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In the current study, the questions assessing self-efficacy are congruent to
outcome expectation for brevity and ease of interpretation. Although Bandura (1977)
was emphatic that outcome expectations are distinct from SEBs, he later admitted the two
are strongly correlated after Kirsch (1985) brought the discriminability between the
constructs into question causing Bandura (1986) to admit the strength of correlation
between the constructs in later works. Research supports the constructs are distinct
beliefs (Meece, Wigfield, & Eccles, 1990); however, examples where one construct isn’t
a direct proxy for the other appears to be the exceptional edge case rather than in general
application or there is a discrepancy between self-efficacy and a desire to engage with the
task (Pajares, 1996).
The Dunning-Kruger Effect exemplifies the complications and inaccuracies that
occur with self-assessment and metacognition and needs to be considered when
examining self-efficacy. The Dunning-Kruger Effect is that the less capable overestimate
their performance and lack the metacognitive ability to recognize their poor performance
with the magnitude of the effect being negatively correlated with actual ability (Kruger &
Dunning, 1999). Ongoing research into this effect suggests impairments of
metacognitive ability are not only associated with an overestimation in ability, but these
impairments are associated with continued poor performance directly resulting from an
inability to self-reflect and accurately appraise performance (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner,
Dunning, & Kruger, 2008).
An important conclusion from research into the Dunning-Kruger effect is that an
individual’s poor metacognitive performance varies by domain and need not be a
terminal state in the domains in which it occurs (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger &
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Dunning, 1999). This effect in an individual appears to be unaffected by modifications in
motivation or quality of feedback but is only diminished through gaining additional
experience in a domain and having directed guidance in acquiring additional
metacognitive skills can significantly decrease this effect (Ehrlinger et al., 2008). These
findings further support the premise of the current study that impaired metacognitive
states can negatively influence learning behaviors but this cycle can be broken through
effective intervention.
An additional implication for the Dunning-Kruger Effect arises in its implications
for emotional processing. While the initial research focused on academic, physical, and
work performance-related skills, there is evidence that the effect also occurs in selfappraisal and management of emotions (Sheldon, Dunning, & Ames, 2014). The
individual who is least capable to recognize or deal with strong emotional states is going
to tend to believe they do not have an issue and will lack insight and ability to decrease
the effects of these states on their metacognitive evaluations and the beliefs resulting
from them. As with academic performance, however, interventions can increase
emotional intelligence and diminish the implications of the Dunning-Kruger Effect on
cognitive processing influenced by an emotional state (Dacre Pool & Qualter, 2012;
Nelis, Quoidbach, Mikolajczak, & Hansenne, 2009; Sheldon et al., 2014).
Given the research on the Dunning-Kruger Effect, an important consideration
with self-efficacy becomes learner’s overestimation of their ability. While high selfefficacy is generally associated with positive outcomes, evidence suggests that
overconfidence negatively impacts academics and is even more resistant to change than
low self-efficacy (Gist & Mitchell, 1992; Vancouver, Thompson, Tischner, & Putka,
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2002). It is therefore prudent to consider learners with the lowest level of ability and the
likelihood that they may be the most susceptible to inflated self-efficacy, especially if
reinforced or exacerbated by congruent emotional states.
For the current study, SEB specifically refers to the pre-learning self-efficacy of
participant’s ability to learn and pass an assessment on instructional material on positive
psychology (SEBPS) and logical fallacies (SEBLF).
Feeling of Knowing. After a learning experience, the FOK is a confidence
judgment expressed as an individual’s belief in how well they have understood and
successfully completed a learning task. Hart (1965, 1966, 1967) developed a four-stage
FOK assessment where researchers: (a) identified questions participants were unable to
answer through production; (b) ask if participants felt they could correctly identify the
correct answer; (c) administer a multiple-choice test; and (d) compare recognition
performance with FOK. The FOK assessment process was the first way of directly
assessing MM (Butterfield, Nelson, & Peck, 1988).
The current study limits its examination of FOK to the relative assessment of
performance relative to peers. Throughout a student’s learning process, the
metacognitive monitoring and cues for self-efficacy occur before a summative
assessment. It is these general feelings of progress that the current measure is attempting
to access, drawing from the spirit of Hart’s work rather than replication of the
methodology. The reliance on performance relative to others is more likely to be aligned
and influenced by self-efficacy, but perceived social comparison is one of the strongest
influences on updates to self-efficacy and resulting behaviors (Bandura, 1977, 1986).
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Reflective Confidence Judgment. After demonstrating a skill or responding to
an evaluation inquiry through a summative assessment, the feeling an individual has as to
the accuracy of the demonstrated knowledge is their RCJ. Reflective cognitive judgment
is similar to FOK, but instead of a relative measure of performance to others, it asks
individuals to express their performance relative to the questions asked. Reflective
cognitive judgment allows individuals to respond more independently of SEB, and it
allows their metacognitive reflection to be more strongly influenced by the difficulty of
the assessment rather than being a function of their perceived ability or relative
performance.
Metacognition and Emotion
Emotion cannot be functionally separated from cognition and has been labeled by
Damasio (1994) as a form of cognition itself. Emotion is deeply interconnected with
physiological states, both influencing and being informed by somatic responses in the
body (Damasio et al., 1996; Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 2007; Levin, Eisenberg, &
Benton, 1991). Further, judgments and behavioral decisions are informed by emotion,
especially when objective information is lacking or equipoise (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007;
Schwarz & Clore, 1983). It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the cognitive
appraisal of learning would be subject to somatic and emotional states present at the time
of appraisal.
The interrelated connection between body, mood, and cognition can create errors
in judgments when misattribution of physiological or emotional response is misattributed
to the cognitive process. An example would be the way students would rate their life
satisfaction on a sunny day as more satisfying than those asked on rainy days (Schwarz &
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Clore, 1983). Most people are unaware of the extent to which they are being influenced
by unrelated emotional and physiological stimuli exerting influence on behavior
(Ikegami, 1993). It is reasonable to conclude that there is an emotional influence on MM
that is outside of conscious awareness and therefore unavailable for monitoring by the
individual.
Koriat’s intrinsic component of MM is expanded upon by research that has
examined how the salience of certain stimuli can increase correct judgment of estimated
recall. A weighting of information occurs based on emotion and embodied cognition as
theorized by Damasio for general cognition (Alban & Kelley, 2013). As intrinsic
metacognitive evaluation is a primary channel for assessing learning, the relationship
between embodied cognition and knowledge of learning appears to be theoretically
sound.
Another important implication for MM arising from the influence of emotion on
cognition is in the selective attending to information. Individuals attend more strongly to
emotionally congruent information (Bhanji & Beer, 2012). During a MM task involving
overall growth from multiple learning and assessment experiences, we would expect that
an individual would incorporate and weigh more heavily those events that evoke an
emotional recall that parallels the assessing individual’s current state.
Cognition is not entirely subject to emotion as top-down processes can
significantly alter emotional states and limit the effects of bottom-up processes (Dolcos,
Iordan, & Dolcos, 2011a). Emotion can have positive effects on cognition, such as
increased creativity and problem-solving arising from positive emotion (Ashby, Isen, &
Turken, 1999); therefore, it is not necessary or desirable to eliminate or minimize
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emotion during MM tasks. Learners should instead increase their monitoring of the
influence of emotion and acquire the ability to test and validate their feelings with
external, objective points of assessment.
Flavell (1979) separated metacognition into four components: (a) metacognitive
knowledge; (b) metacognitive experience; (c) goals; and (d) strategies. In the current
study, the distinction between metacognitive knowledge and experience are of particular
interest. Flavell calls metacognitive experience “any conscious cognitive or affective
experience that accompany and pertain to any intellectual enterprise” (1979, p. 906).
While cognition cannot be directly accessed (Johansson, Hall, Sikström, Tärning, & Lind,
2006; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), we are able to examine and update our metacognitive
beliefs. Flavell (1979, p. 906) gives an example of “… the sudden feeling you do not
understand something another person just said.” The arrival of such a feeling without an
external indicator would be the result of emotional processes that could then drive goal
setting and choice of strategies.
Increased metacognitive skills are generally associated with better learning
outcomes as individuals are able to make better use of instructional material and make
better choices in studying and information seeking (Spada, Hiou, & Nikcevic, 2006).
The role of emotion in making metacognitive judgments is less understood. If emotion is
inseparable from cognition, it would follow that metacognition is similarly driven by
emotional and mood states. A clearer understanding of the influence of emotion in
metacognition may further illuminate MM, but this research is still largely lacking from
the literature.
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Social Cognition
Learners use external information to determine their progress within learning.
They seek social cues of expectation and standards for normal outcomes either through
direct instruction or social comparison. Social cognition therefore plays a role in setting
and interpreting learning outcomes.
Through fMRI and brain scanning research, we have gained insights into the
connection between learning judgments, emotion and social cognition (Longe et al.,
2010). Pathology studies of the left temporal pole and insula have shown how the neural
systems responsible for emotional responses such as empathy and compassion are also
utilized in self-reassurance (Longe et al., 2010). The implication for these findings is that
poor emotional regulation within the social domain could have implications for social
referencing and information acquisition as well as one’s ability to make a self-assuring
evaluation of behavioral or learning outcomes.
As a learner seeks information for comparison or feedback from either a fellow
student or an instructor, their social engagement and the resulting processing of
information will arise from emotion-based cognition and decision-making processes
(Forgas, 2008; Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000). The extent to which the individual is aware
of the influence of emotion allows for greater social competence and information
monitoring (Dolan, 2002), but not all emotional influence will be under conscious
awareness (Forgas, 2008). Emotion should then have both a direct and indirect effect on
MM through social cognition. Directly, the quality of externally obtained measures of
progress are in part based on social engagement mediated by emotion, and indirectly,
emotional response influences how the learner reflects on obtained information.
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If knowledge of learning is assessed after working with a group or interacting
with others, social cognition can impact MM indirectly through changes in emotional
states. While individuals with highly adaptive social functioning may have healthy
emotional and social cognition, an important secondary effect may occur as emotions are
transferred from a group or individuals to the learner (Barsade, 2002; Hatfield, Cacioppo,
& Rapson, 1993). Socially acquired emotions could later influence the individual's
cognition when the person reflects on their learning experience regardless if the emotions
are relevant to their judgments or their objective experience of their own learning.
The transfer of emotion from social exposure can be expanded to include an even
larger transference of attitudes. As new associations are made during the learning
process between the central learning process and the peripheral social exposure, transfer
of favorable attitudes can take root in a student and become part of their experience and
beliefs around their learning (Aiken, 1970; Das & Nanda, 1963). These attitudes and
their associated emotion can be also come from outside of the learning environment, such
as those learned by parents (Parsons, Adler, & Kaczala, 1982), and may inform
judgments without being based in actual academic experience. Depending on their
source and congruence with learning, these contagion attitudes may help or hinder
individual assessments of academic understanding.
Memory and Learning
Both memory and learning are directly affected by emotional states, but most
learners are not accurately informed of this relationship. It is typically assumed that
strong emotions enhance episodic memory, but this relationship is not a simple one as
different emotions and interacting levels of intensity can work to either increase or
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decrease recall (Shafer & Dolcos, 2012). Factors influencing the effect of emotion on
memory are multifaceted and include factors such as level of distraction due to the
relatedness of the current emotion, cognitive demands of material to be remembered, and
even moderation by gender (Canli, Desmond, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 2002; Shafer & Dolcos,
2012).
Emotional responses cause the amygdala to modulate memory processes within
the hippocampus through traditional Hebbian synaptic responses, the influence of
elevated neurohormones such as cortisol but additionally through synchronization of
theta waves across multiple brain regions (McIntyre, McGaugh, & Williams, 2012). The
result is a direct causal relationship between emotional arousal in the amygdala and
changes in synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus associated with memory, specifically
with the consolidation of long-term potentiation (LTP) into long-term memory, a process
called emotional tagging (Bergado, Lucas, & Richter-Levin, 2011).
Strong emotional responses may facilitate memory consolidation, thereby
increasing recall afterward; however, immediate recall may actually be decreased due to
emotional intensity until consolidation has occurred and emotional arousal may work
against memory beyond a certain level of intensity (Kleinsmith & Kaplan, 1963). This
relationship is further complicated by the possibility that strong emotion can increase our
beliefs in our memories fidelity without actually increasing its accuracy (Forgas, 2011).
Rather than emotion, it is attentional focus and the level of distinctiveness predictive of
immediate recall (Talmi & McGarry, 2012) with emotion rather than salience becoming
increasingly important post consolidation (Hunt, 2009; Kleinsmith & Kaplan, 1963).
While emotion serves to direct attention, emotion is differentiable from attention in its
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ability to stimulate and maintain accurate information for peripheral details unattended to
by attentional processes (Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). The difficulty in assessing the
precise nature of emotion on memory becomes more complex when considered in the
context of more complex learning tasks. When presented with a list of items, individuals
under emotionally aroused states or prompts tend to have higher recall than nonemotional groups; however, when the task extends to learning associations between items
rather than rote recall, the emotional recall group either tends to perform poorly or no
differently when compared to controls (Madan, Caplan, Lau, & Fujiwara, 2012) or only
show improvement when the elicited emotional state is positive (Zimmerman & Kelley,
2010).
Apart from objective recall, the role of memory and emotion has an important
secondary effect. The remembrance and reactivation of emotions and mood states from
prior experience tend to be more salient and of greater intensity when the event is
negative (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). This effect can be
paradoxically detrimental in the case of feedback. When individuals are asked to recall
feedback they have received, they tend to have a stronger immediate recall for negative
feedback; however, negative feedback is recalled with a strong defensive bias and tends
to be inaccurately retained in memory when compared to more positive feedback
(Baumeister & Cairns, 1992). Self-assessment of learning arising from a bias for
negative outcomes and unreliable negative feedback cannot be expected to be reliable
report of a student’s actual progress in a learning task. Further, such biases can
significantly influence an individual to avoid both further feedback and additional
negative experiences if they perceive they are unable to be successful (Baumeister &
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Cairns, 1992; Maier & Seligman, 1976). This type of avoidance behavior, if maintained,
begins to effect self-regulation (Oertig et al., 2013) and further diminish the ability to
make effective assessments.
Learning has a complex relationship with emotional states distinct from simple
memory processes (Kornell & Bjork, 2009). In addition to the social influence, emotion
can impact learning by creating extra cognitive load that may interfere with the learning
process (Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2009). If the learners associate this additional
cognitive load with the material being learned rather than their current emotional state,
this misattribution could result in the learner overestimating the difficulty of the material
and the extent of their own progress.
The Current Study
This study proposes an investigation of the effect of emotion on the self-assessed
learning beliefs of metacognitive monitoring. There are few previous studies to establish
an evidence-based foundation for the basis of this study, mostly conjecture and the
theoretical implications from related literature. The current study helps to address the
current lack of literature on this topic.
The research investigator of the current study seeks to answer the following
research questions:
•

RQ1: Are emotions associated with how people predict their ability to perform
on a learning task (SEB)? Positive emotion is predicted to increase beliefs in selfefficacy, while negative emotion will decrease self-efficacy.
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•

RQ2: Are emotions associated with how learners believe they have performed on
a learning task (FOK and RCJ)? Positive emotion is predicted to increase beliefs
in post-assessment performance, while negative emotion will decrease them.

•

RQ3: Are distress tolerance or intelligence intervening variables in the
relationship between emotion or arousal and learning beliefs? Distress tolerance
and intelligence are both predicted to influence the model for the impact of
emotions on learning beliefs.

•

RQ4: Do demographic factors influence the relationship between emotion and
learning beliefs? Variables such as age are predicted to be important intervening
variables in the emotion/MM relationship.

•

RQ5: Do environmental factors influence the relationship between emotion and
learning beliefs? Environment is predicted to have a small effect but largely only
serve as a proxy for emotional states.
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Chapter III
Methods
Overview
The current chapter reports the procedures, participants, and analytic approach
applied to answer the research questions for this study. The quantitative, cross-sectional
survey methods employed were chosen to investigate the hypothesis that emotional states
have a direct relationship to an individual’s state beliefs about their learning, both in
terms of self-efficacy before learning and the outcome of a learning event after
assessment. Measures of emotional states and learning beliefs were applied before and
after an educational video and related assessment to determine the strength of the
relationship between study variables.
Objective
The purpose of this study was to examine the role of emotions in learning beliefs.
Study variables and assessments were selected to reveal possible relationships between
emotional states and beliefs about learning, both before and after a learning event. The
general hypothesis, that there is a direct relationship between emotion state and beliefs on
learning efficacy and outcome, are explored as five research questions:
•

RQ1: Are emotions associated with how people predict their ability to perform a
learning task (SEB)?
o H01: There is no relationship between emotion and self-efficacy.

•

RQ2: Are emotions associated with how learners believe they have performed on
a learning task (FOK and RCJ)?
o H02: There is no relationship between emotional state and FOK or RCJ.
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•

RQ3: Are distress tolerance or intelligence intervening variables in the
relationship between emotion or arousal and learning beliefs?
o H03: Neither distress tolerance nor intelligence are intervening variables in
the relationship between emotion and learning beliefs.

•

RQ4: Do demographic factors influence the relationship between emotion and
learning beliefs?
o H04: Demographics are not intervening variables in the relationship
between emotion and learning beliefs.

•

RQ5: Do environmental factors influence the relationship between emotion and
learning beliefs?
o H05: Environmental factors are not intervening variables in the relationship
between emotion and learning beliefs.

Participants
The study used a convenience sample of volunteers from the University of New
Mexico research pool. These individuals were students currently enrolled in EDPY 310
or EDPY 303 and receiving class credit for participation. Volunteers were primarily
students enrolled in or entering the teacher education program at UNM. Participation
was not mandatory as an option for an alternative assignment for equivalent class credit
was provided. As participation in a research study for class credit needed to be equally
available to all students, a maximum number of participants was determined by total
enrollment for the Spring 2016 semester rather than meeting an obtained power, but 100
students was the minimum expected number of participants.
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After approval by the University of New Mexico Institutional Review Board
(IRB), a total of 104 individuals entered the study. The sample consisted of 87.5%
females (n = 91) and 12.5% males (n = 13). Freshman accounted for 8.7% of the sample
(n = 9), sophomores 21.2% (n = 22), juniors 40.4% (n = 42), seniors 29% (n = 20) and
graduate students less than 1% (n = 1). The distribution of ethnicities was 2.9% Asian (n
= 3), 3.8% Black (n = 4), 35.6% Hispanic (n = 37), 41.3% White (n = 43), and 8.7%
reporting Multiracial (n = 9). Participants' ages ranged from 17 to 54 (M = 24.3, SD =
7.21). Therefore, the study produced a sample that was predominantly White and
Hispanic females.
One participant fell asleep during the presentation of the study videos. The
participant would not be measurable on what they have learned, and their level of
engagement with the study in general was in question. The participant was asked to
withdraw when they awoke at the end of the video. They had completed only the initial
demographics, but none of their data were included in the study.
A priori conditions were set to examine possible exclusion of additional
individuals from the dataset. Given the sample was obtained by offering class credit that
was more efficient than the alternative assignment, consideration of participant’s fidelity
in answering questions seemed prudent to ensure participants were full participants and
not simply apathetically filling a seat for course credit. Exclusion was considered by
category rather than by individual participants. The categories were: (1) participants who
completed the Ravens in less than 15 minutes; (2) participants who were inconsistent in
answering a repeated question the same way; and (3) participants who fell into both
groups 1 and 2. However, the resulting analysis of participants responses was not
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statistically significant than non-group members; therefore, no additional exclusions were
made.
Two different locations were used. One was a small, dark basement room and the
other was a large, well-lit classroom. The basement used a small projector with a screen
approximately 42 inches, while the classroom used a full-sized, 90-inch projector screen
with a higher quality sound system. Available participation times were split between the
two locations with 48.1% participating in the classroom (n = 50) and 51.9% participating
in the basement (n = 54). Two-hour sessions were scheduled between 10 a.m. and 6 p.m.
at both locations between March 28 and April 8, 2016. Participants were asked to remain
in the study for the full two hours, even if they completed their questionnaires early.
Procedure
Each session began with volunteers being informed of their rights as participants,
including the ability to do an alternative assignment for course credit. After being
informed about the study, individuals agreeing to participate gave signed consent.
Participants were instructed that this the study involves a learning task and that they will
be given a brief assessment of what they have learned and understand from two different
videos they were shown. Subjects were given explicit instruction on how to take each
assessment as well as the purpose of those assessments. They were informed the duration
of the study was approximately two hours.
Participants were asked on a five-point Likert scale from 1 – “Far worse than
others” to 5 – “Far better than others” to rate how well they believed they would perform
on two different assessments. This self-rating was used as an indicator of SEB. One
assessment would be covering a video on logical fallacies, and another on positive
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psychology. After completing the SEB questions, they completed the PANAS-X and the
SAMS measures of emotion and arousal.
Participants were then shown two different videos. One was a lecture on positive
psychology by one of the leading psychologists in the field, Dr. Martin Seligman. The
second was a philosophy video on logical fallacies produced by US Represented. Video
order was randomly assigned, with order of video being recorded as a possible
intervening variable. These two videos were chosen as they were both familiar to the
researcher and, through previous instructional use, it was believed there would be
significant variance in efficacy beliefs between the two videos. Previously, students
tended to believe the positive psychology content would be far easier to understand and
master.
As emotion was not being artificially induced, it was desirable to have content
that was unfamiliar to the participants, yet whose brief introduction was sufficient to
evoke strong responses. Most learning takes place in the presence of strong, pre-formed
learning experiences, such as a high school student attending an English class. A more
longitudinal, naturalistic approach would be desirable to access the influence of these
preformed conditions. Without the ability to access natural classroom interactions for the
current study, videos that elicited distinct, strong responses was desirable to ensure
response and performance variance across participants.
After watching the videos, participants were given a 15-question test over each of
the video’s content. One question on each test was redundant, checking if participants
would give the same response on both questions. The positive psychology assessment
was multiple selection and the logical fallacies assessment was multiple choice. In each
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case, the content assessment was followed with questions assessing performance beliefs.
One question was a relative measure, or FOK, where participants were asked to rate on a
five-point Likert scale how well they believed they understood the content, from “not at
all” to “very well.” The second belief question was an absolute measure used to measure
RCJ, where participants were asked to guess how many questions they believed they had
answered correctly out of the 15 possible. Order of assessment matched the order of
video presentation.
Following the content assessments, participants were given the Four-Dimension
Mood Scale (4DMS) and the Distress Tolerance Scale (DTS). When all participants had
completed the DTS, the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrix (APM) was administered.
Participants were given 50 minutes to complete the Ravens, with their completion time
being recorded as they finished.
Instruments
The following instruments were used to assess study constructs. Both the
demographics and self-efficacy belief questionnaire and the knowledge and belief
assessment were created for the current study, the other instruments were taken from the
literature based on congruency to use in other studies. See Table 1 for a complete list of
study variables and instruments.
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Table 1
Summary of study variables
Variable

Source

Type

Demographics
DESBQ
Independent
Age
Gender
Years Attendance
Ethnicity
Learning Beliefs
Dependent
SEB
DESBQ
FOK
KBA
RCJ
KBA
Performance
DESBQ
Control
Emotion
Independent
Positive
PANAS-X
Negative
PANAS-X
Fear
PANAS-X
Hostility
PANAS-X
Guilt
PANAS-X
Sadness
PANAS-X
Joviality
PANAS-X
PvN
SAM
Intensity
SAM
Dominance
SAM
Positive energy
4DMS
Relaxation
4DMS
Negative arousal
4DMS
Tiredness
4DMS
Distress Tolerance
DTS
Independent
Tolerance
Absorption
Appraisal
Regulation
Intelligence
APM
Intervening
Environment
Observation
Intervening
Date
Video Order
Classroom
Date
Time of day
Note. PvS = positive vs negative; DESBQ = Demographic and selfefficacy beliefs questionnaire; KBA = Knowledge and belief assessment
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Demographics and Self-Efficacy Beliefs Questionnaire (see Appendix A).
Participants were asked to provide their date of birth, gender, years of college attendance,
and ethnicity; these measures served as independent variables. Self-efficacy beliefs were
assessed by having participants rate their confidence in their predicted performance on
each of the learning tasks.
Knowledge and Belief Assessments (see Appendix B and C). The knowledge
and belief assessments were used to generate the control variable of performance and the
dependent variables of FOK and RCJ. Two knowledge and belief assessments were
used, one each covering the positive psychology and learning fallacies videos. Both
consisted of 14 knowledge questions covering the content and one question that was a
repeat of a previous question for a total of 15 questions. The logical fallacies questions
were multiple choice, but the positive psychology could optionally be graded as multiple
selection. Both assessments had a 14-point total score, but a sum score was calculated
for positive psychology, where each most questions had multiple possible selections for a
possible maximum score of 50 points. The belief assessments asked students to rate how
well they believed they did relative to other and as an estimate of the correct number of
questions they were able to get correct, providing FOK and RCJ respectively.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-X; see
Appendix D). The PANAS-X was used to assess the independent variables positive and
negative emotion, fear, hostility, guilt, sadness, joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness,
shyness, fatigue, serenity, and surprise. It is a measure of state and trait emotionality
(Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999; Watson & Clark, 1999). It is organized in a
hierarchical structure, with most variance accounted for by the two higher-order
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dimensions of positive and negative emotion. There are several second-order subscales,
such as fear, guilt, attentiveness, and fatigue. Instructions may reference different
timeframes, from current feelings to experiences over the past few weeks. The current
study asked individuals to score how they feel in the moment the PANAS-X was being
completed. The PANAS-X presents 60 words to the participant (such as “bold” and
“blue”) that they are asked to score on a five-point Likert scale from 1 – “very slightly or
not at all" to 5 – “extremely". Most words used in the primary scales are not reused in
subscales. Reliability, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha, has been shown to range from
.85 to .9 with strong convergent validity with other measures of emotion (Merz et al.,
2013; Watson & Clark, 1999).
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; see Appendix E). The SAM was used to
assess the independent variables positive versus negative emotion, intensity, and feelings
of dominance (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Each scale consists of five pictographs. The
SAM simplifies the process of measuring emotional states to identification of simple
graphics along the most researched dimensions of emotionality and is based on the
demonstrated strength of the pictographic pain scale now widely in use (Bynion &
Feldner, 2017; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). Lang and colleagues (1993)
established strong convergent validity between the SAM and externally observable
measures, such as facial expression and galvanic skin response; other studies suggesting a
Cronbach’s alpha reliability measure for adults ranging from .82 to .98 (Backs, da Silva,
& Han, 2005; Nabizadeh Chianeh, Vahedi, Rostami, & Nazari, 2012). The SAM is the
only assessment in this study’s battery that treats positive and negative emotion as polar
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ends of a single dimension. Its treatment of arousal as the most general, and it is the only
measure of dominance.
Four-Dimension Mood State (4DMS; Appendix F). The 4DMS is used to
measure the independent variables positive energy, relaxation, negative arousal, and
tiredness.in the current study. The 4DMS consists of questions designed to measure
emotion by having participants give a five-point Likert rating on a scale from 1 – “very
slightly or not at all” to 5 – “extremely” to 20 adjectives which assesses emotional level
according to four dimensions used as independent variables in the current study: positive
energy, relaxation, negative arousal, and tiredness. The 4DMS was designed to
emphasize positive and negative emotion similar to the PANAS-X (Gregg & Shepherd,
2009; Tellegen et al., 1999). The 4DMS is distinguished from the PANAS assessment by
including low-arousal PA and low-arousal NA factors (relaxation and tiredness,
respectively). Cronbach’s alpha reliability ranges from .88 to .93 for the different
dimensions (Huelsman, Richard C. Nemanick, & Munz, 1998).
Distress Tolerance Scale (DTS; Appendix G). The DTS is used as a measure of
the independent variables tolerance, absorption, appraisal and regulation. These variables
are used as measures of distress tolerance, or the ability to manage and adjust to the
effects of states of negative emotion (Simons & Gaher, 2005; Zvolensky et al., 2010).
The DTS consists of 15 statements, such as “I’ll do anything to stop feeling distressed or
upset.” Participants rate each statement on a five-point Likert scale from 1 – “Strongly
Disagree” to 5 – “Strongly Agree.” All questions are used as a higher order, general
assessment of distress tolerance. Four second-order subscales are also scored: tolerance,
appraisal, regulation, and absorption. Simon and Gaher (2005) report Cronbach alphas
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for the DTS from .82 to .82, values are consistent with later studies, with the general
factor supporting the greatest internal consistency (Leyro, Bernstein, Vujanovic,
McLeish, & Zvolensky, 2011).
Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM; Pearson, 2011). The APM
was used to assess the independent variable of intelligence. The APM consists of 48
puzzles to assess fluid intelligence through problem-solving and reasoning (Raven, 1989;
Raven, Raven, & Court, 2011). The 48 items are divided into two sets, a 12-item set and
a 36-item set. For each question, seven images are presented that represents a
progressive pattern. Participants are asked to choose one of eight possible images that
would best complete the presented pattern. The assessment is scored by counting the
total number of correct answers. The APM was selected as it is an intelligence measure
well-suited to college students as it designed to differentiate people at or above a mean
level of intelligence (Bors & Stokes, 1998; Raven, 1989; Raven et al., 2011). Pearson
reports a Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .77 to .85 for English-speaking samples (2011).
Standard administration can be timed (40-minute) or untimed. For the current study, a
40-minute administration was used; however, the individual times taken were also
recorded to the nearest minute.
Power
G*Power software (v. 3.1) was used to estimate post-hoc achieved power (Faul,
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Using an assumption of medium effect size (f2 =
.15) and an  = .05, a multiple regression with five independent variables achieved 80%
power (1-, where  is the probability of error) at 98 participants. For the current study,
achieved power ranged from 94.4% (two independent variables) to 85.6% (five
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independent variables). However, actual power achieved is lower due to the inflated
false-positive error rate that occurs through repeated tests of significance (Lazzeroni &
Ray, 2012). Additionally, as other researchers have previously noted, the relevance of
post-hoc power analysis is of questionable value (Hoenig & Heisey, 2001). Current
study power may most strongly indicate the over-exclusion of significant variables,
especially in regression models with more than two explanatory variables.
Data Analysis
The current study used the statistical programming language R (v. 3.3.2) for all
data management and analyses after initially entering data into Microsoft EXCEL.
Multiple linear regression was the primary statistical strategy to examine the research
questions. As the literature on direct effects of emotion on SEB is sparse, an exploratory
approach was taken to examine these relationships. In each case, forward and backward
regression models were examined to arrive at a parsimonious, simultaneous entry
multiple regression models.
Variables were examined for outliers and the meeting of assumptions
(homoscedasticity, normality, multicoliniarity). Descriptive statistics were generated for
each study variable. Correlation between variables was examined. Missing data were
assessed and missing values imputed with modeled data.
RQ1: Are emotions associated with how people predict their ability to perform a
learning task (SEB)? Stepwise multiple linear regression was used to assess the effects
of emotional states on SEB for both the positive psychology and logical fallacies videos.
The PANAS-X, SAM, and 4DMS were used for measures of emotion, and the pre-video
assessment was used for SEB.

42
RQ2: Are emotions associated with how learners believe they have performed on
a learning task (FOK and RCJ)? Stepwise multiple linear regression models were
constructed to analyze if emotion predicted FOK and RJC. Self-efficacy belief was used
as a control variable. The PANAS-X, SAM, and 4DMS were used for measures of
emotion, and the post-video assessments were used for FOK and RJC.
RQ3: Are distress tolerance or intelligence intervening variables in the
relationship between emotion or arousal and learning beliefs? Stepwise multiple linear
regression models were constructed to examine the role of intelligence and emotion
regulation as intervening variables on the relationship between emotion and SEB, FOK,
and RJC. Outcomes from the APM were used as intelligence scores, and the DTS was
used as the measure of distress tolerance. Models from RQ1 and RQ2 were re-examined
with the addition of the intelligence and distress tolerance variables.
RQ4: Do demographic factors influence the relationship between emotion and
learning beliefs? Stepwise linear regression was used to re-examine the models used in
RQ1 – RQ3 with demographics variables as intervening variables. Specifically, age,
ethnicity, gender, and year were used from the initial survey form.
RQ5: Do environmental factors influence the relationship between emotion and
learning beliefs? Stepwise linear regression was used to examine if environmental
effects acted as intervening variables in effects observed in regression models from RQ1
– RQ4. Environment variables included testing location, time of day, and day of the
week, an order of presentation of learning material.
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Concluding Remarks
The current study is intended to provide a basis for future research on emotion
and learning as well as a rationale for interventions that focus on emotion regulation with
metacognitive strategies. This work seeks to clarify the relationship between emotional
state during a learning experience and the metacognitive monitoring process. Direct as
well as intervening effects were examined through multiple linear regression models.
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Chapter IV
Results
Overview
The purpose of the current research was to examine the role of emotion and
arousal in learning belief development. The research questions were informed by a
variety of analyses but relied most heavily on stepwise multiple regression linear models.
No participants were excluded from the study based on a-priori criteria for exclusion.
Missing data were imputed rather than excluded from the study.
There was little literature to inform decisions in model building. As there was no
a priori hypothesis for order of variable entry, a direct method was used for entering
independent variables rather than hierarchical modeling. Models were examined from
both a step-up and step-downward approach. As supporting literature on the study
variables is limited, a flexible and exploratory approach was taken in the regression
models, favoring the step-down regression models at the risk of overfitting.
Individual models were built for the two different content types, logical fallacies
(LF) and positive psychology (PS). To answer the research questions, beliefs about
learning performance, before and after the learning experience, were used as the
dependent variable with measures of emotions, arousal, dominance, regulation, and
intelligence as predictors. Intelligence, distress tolerance, environment, and demographic
variables were examined as intervening variables.
The first research question examines the role of emotion and arousal in prelearning beliefs. The second examines the relationship of emotion and arousal predicting
post-learning beliefs. The third research question examines how the relationships in the
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first two research questions are modified or explained by intelligence and emotion
regulation. The fourth research question examines the previous models in context of
demographic variables. The fifth research question examines any influence
environmental study variables may have had on model outcomes.
Study Conditions
Exclusions. It is clear some students may have become rushed or used a nontraditional approach to answering some questions; however, there was insufficient
evidence that any participant was willfully careless or non-participatory. While some
scores may be more extreme and exert some questionable influence, no evidence could be
produced that would argue for their exclusion from the study beyond providing trimmed
values, closer approximating mean behavior. Despite some minor anomalies, no
individual’s scores were excluded or considered missing in favor of an imputed value.
This choice may have lowered the total variance accounted for in the models that follow;
however, that may yet be appropriate until the reason for the anomalies can be better
accounted for or controlled through experimentation.
Additional data preparation. Data were entered twice and the two data sets
checked against each other. Of all data entered, 2.8% of the data were inconsistent
between the two entries. Any non-matching data points were reconfirmed. After data
entry, continuous predictor variables were mean centered and standardized to simplify
interpretation. Dependent variables were left in the scale in which they were assessed
and scaled at the time of analysis if they were later used as control variables in other
analyses.
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Missing Data. Missing data were assessed for missing at random (MAR) and
missing completely at random (MCAR). There were 11 possible data patterns
discovered, but these all appeared to be related to formatting (missing the back of page)
or skipping a random question. There were no clear markers of missing data (for
example, skipping all questions related to Sadness). Little’s test was not-significant (Χ2 =
140.83, df = 155, p = .786) retaining the null hypothesis that the data is MCAR. Little’s
test was conducted on each major scale, with no significance found in any subset of the
data. Evidence suggests then that imputation may continue assuming missing values are
MAR.
Of the total dataset, 1.9% of the data were missing. If restricted to calculated and
study variables, 2.6% was missing. Approximately one in five assessment questions
contained at least one row of missing data. The variables with the greatest amount of
missing data were the negative and positive emotion measure (PANAS-X) at 6.7% and
3.9%, respectively. All other variables had less than 2% missing data.
Missing data were imputed using MICE – multiple imputation via chained
equations –and predictive means matching (Azur, Stuart, Frangakis, & Leaf, 2011; van
Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoom, 2011). Multiple iterations were performed and the first
complete imputed dataset was retained. The imputed dataset was checked against the
initial dataset for significant alterations to the score distributions; however, the
imputations appeared to have minimal impact on the overall behavior of the study
variables.
Locations. Data collection occurred either in a well-lit, open classroom or in a
darker, slightly less appealing lab room in a basement. All data were collected at the
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University of New Mexico. Data collection occurred from March 25 to April 8, during
the Spring 2016 semester.
Instruments. All instruments demonstrated sufficient reliability and internal
structure for the needs of the current study. The factor structure of the PANAS-X, DTS,
and 4DMS was examined and found to have structures congruous with the published
factor analyses of each measure. Reliability was calculated on the DTS (ω h = .74, ωt =
.93), the 4DMS (ωh = .50, ωt = .93), and a limited PANAS-X (restricted to positive,
negative, fatigue, and self-assurance; ω h = .79, ωt = .91). Reliability estimates are low but
sufficient for the DTS and PANAS-X. The small sample size for this study made it
unlikely that appropriate model fit would be achieved for a CFA or accurate estimation of
omega. As the data for each of these tests are generated from a Likert scale
questionnaire, the polychoric correlation matrix for each assessment was used to account
for the ordinal nature of the data.
The 12 item APM short form has an expected reliability of about α = .71, but the
current study only produced α = .59. The full, set 2 APM typically has reported
reliabilities of about α = .85, which was similar to the reliability found for the current
study (α = .86). The low reliability in the short APM was also seen in the two knowledge
assessments (αLF = .56, αPS = .67). Low reliabilities may be due, in part to sample size,
but more likely internal consistency wasn’t a primary concern in the creation of these
assessments. When the performance measures were examined through IRT 2PL models,
a sufficient level of test information was achieved. While not ideal, given the sample size
and type of tests, reliability may be an indicator low power was achieved, but sufficient
to support study findings.
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Assumptions. The data and analyses that follow were examined extensively for
violations of assumptions and overall model fit. Independence was largely assumed,
though items were screened for repeated or dependent language and the Durbin Watson
test was used to check for non-independence of errors. Outliers and heteroscedasticity
were examined statistically and graphically. Variance inflation factor was used to check
against multicollinearity. Negative emotion and its sub-components suffered from a floor
effect. Using a square root transformation had minimal influence on effect size and
model fit; therefore, the data were presented without square root transformation to
simplify interpretation.
Outcomes
Correlations. Correlations between the variables were examined to better
understand the strengths of association between the variables in general. The research
questions for this study require more complex modeling than simple correlations, as they
require that many of the variables in question be considered as intervening variables
rather than ones of direct association.
The video outcomes generally demonstrate positive, moderate correlations with
linear relationships. Participant’s SEB on the LF assessment (M = 3.47, SD = .79) was
significantly lower than how well their SEB for PS (M = 3.71, SD = .68), t(103) = 3.08, p
= .003, and were moderately correlated (r = .42, p < .001). Despite initial beliefs,
participants did significantly better, t(103) = 13.21, p < .001, on the LF assessment (M =
6.53, SD = 2.43) than the PS assessment (M = 3.64. SD = 2.26); however, they were
strongly correlated (scores, r = .57, p < .001). The correlation between learning beliefs
before and after the videos and assessment were similar for both the LM (see Figure 1 for
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all). Post-assessment learning beliefs were significantly different between subject (see
Table 2). The total and sum scores for the PS video assessment were strongly correlated
(r = .86, p < .001).
Figure 2 shows the factors of arousal from the 4DMS and SAM. Surprisingly,
the general measure of arousal from the SAM was not correlated with the arousal
measures from the 4DMS. Tiredness was associated with negative arousal (r = .66, p <
.001) and positive energy was associated with relaxation (r = .42, p < .001), but the other
correlations were weak.

Figure 1. Learning Beliefs and Performance Score Correlations. ScoreLF and ScorePS =
performance scores on LF and PS. SumPS = PS scored as a total of partial credit points
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Table 2
Belief and Performance Differences Between LF and PS
Logical Fallacies

Positive Psychology

Variable

M

SD

M

SD

t(103)

p

SEB

3.47

.79

3.71

.68

3.09

.003

FOK

2.91

.67

3.30

.82

4.55

<.001

RCJ

7.36

2.98

9.09

3.08

6.40

<.001

Score

6.53

2.54

3.64

2.26

13.21

<.001

Figure 2. Measures of Arousal.
PE = Positive energy; NA = Negative arousal
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The outcomes from the learning events were examined for a relationship to the
other study variables. The only significant predictor of performance was intelligence as
measured by the APM. Intelligence accounted for about 28.6% of the variance in
performance on the positive psychology content and 38.1% of the variance in the logical
fallacies content.
Research Questions.
RQ1. Are emotions associated with how people predict their ability to perform a
learning task (SEB)?
Multiple linear regression models were created to analyze the relationship
between self-efficacy beliefs and measures of emotion. Models were examined using a
combination of ANOVA based model testing and AIC stepwise multiple regressions.
Hostility, fear, sadness, fatigue, and positive emotion were from the PANAS-X.
Tiredness and negative arousal were from the 4DMS. Dominance was from the SAM.
Modeling expected outcome beliefs for the logical fallacies video, a significant
regression equation was found (F(5,97) = 5.43, p < .001) with an R2 = .219 indicating the
model accounted for about 21.9% of the variance in the SEBLF belief. The final model
indicates SEBLF is predicted by sadness (β = .204) fear (β = -.158) positive emotion (β =
.265), tiredness (β = -.233), and fatigue (β = .224). All factors were significant, p < .05.
Modeling expected outcome beliefs for the positive psychology video, a
significant regression equation was found (F(7,95) = 4.88, p < .001) with an R2 = .264,
indicating the model accounted for about 26.4% of the variance in the SEBPS belief. The
SEBPS model was significantly improved (F(1,2) = 4.04, p = .02) by adding a negative
arousal and a dominance factor to the model. Based on the final model, participant
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SEBPS is predicted by sadness (β = .126) fear (β = -.140) positive emotion (β = .232),
tiredness (β = -.213), fatigue (β = .166), negative arousal (β = .159), and dominance (β =
.131). All factors were significant, p < .05, except sadness. Sadness was retained for
model salience and relative size of effect despite not obtaining significance (p = .07).
Negative emotion did not fit the model as a single factor. When multiple
measures of negative emotion were included in the model, there was an issue of
independence as multiple questions were repeated in the calculations for each of their
scores. Overall report of negative emotion was also low. Therefore, the individual
constructs for negative emotions were examined in the regression models.
RQ2. Are emotions associated with how learners believe they have performed on
a learning task (FOK and RCJ)?
Multiple linear regression models were constructed to analyze the relationship
FOK and RJC with measures of emotion and arousal, controlling for SEB and actual
performance as measured by a learning outcome assessment. Modeling belief of relative
outcome, FOK, for the Logical fallacies video, a significant regression equation was
found (F(3,99) = 18.48, p < .001) with an R2 = .359 indicating the model accounted for
about 35.9% of the variance in the FOKLF belief. Based on the model with standardized
predictor variables, participant FOKLF was decreased by fear (β = -.180), and increased
by previous prediction (SEBLF, β = .298) and actual learning performance (β = .289).
Modeling post-learning belief on the number of items correct, RCJLF, a significant model
was found (F(4,98) = 13.96, p < .001) with an R2 = .363 indicating the model accounted for
about 36.3% of the variance in the RCJLF belief. An increase in RCJLF was predicted by
increased positive energy (β = .562), tiredness (β = .440), previous prediction (SEBLF, β =
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1.11) and actual learning performance (β = .934). All variables were significant (p < .05)
except tiredness in the RCJLF model (p = .08). For the RCJLF model, dominance was not a
significant factor.
Modeling outcome FOKPS beliefs for positive psychology, a significant regression
equation was found (F(3,99) = 19.16, p < .001) with an R2 = .367 indicating the model
accounted for about 36.7% of the variance in the FOKPS belief. Participant FOKPS was
decreased by fear (β = -.136), and increased by previous prediction (SEBPS, β = .320) and
actual learning performance (β = .309). Modeling post belief on number of items correct,
RCJPS, a significant model was found (F(3,99) = 10.6, p < .001) with an R2 = .243
indicating the model accounted for about 24.3% of the variance in the RCJPS belief. An
increase in RCJPS was predicted by increased dominance (β = .582)), previous prediction
(SEBPS, β = .714) and actual learning performance (β = .876). All variables were
significant predictors (p < .05). For the RCJPS model, positive energy and tiredness were
not significant factors.
RQ3. Are distress tolerance or intelligence intervening variables in the
relationship between emotion or arousal and learning beliefs?
Multiple linear regression models were used to examine the effects of
intelligence, as measured by the APM, and emotion regulation from the DTS. Multiple
linear regression models were rebuilt to include emotion regulation and APM scores for
SEB, FOK and RJC. A new, significant regression model was fit to SEBLF (F(8,94) = 5.98,
p < .001) with an R2 = .337, indicating the model accounted for about 34.2% of the
variance in the SEBLF belief . In the updated model, increased SEBLF is predicted by
increased sadness (β = .159) and fatigue (β = .193) and intelligence (β = .230); it is
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decreased by fear (β = -.167) and tiredness (β = -.206). There is an interaction between
positive energy and regulation (positive energy, β = 1.21; emotion regulation, β = .668;
interaction, β = -.642). All factors were significant, p < .05, except the interaction term
(p = .057).
Multiple linear regression models were rebuilt for the positive psychology belief
outcomes to include emotion regulation and APM scores for SEB, FOK and RJC. There
was insufficient evidence for Intelligence and emotion regulation contributing to SEBPS
or FOKPS, therefore there was no change in these models. A new, significant regression
model was fit to RCJPS (F(4,98) = 10.41, p < .001) with an R2 = .298, indicating the model
accounted for about 29.8% of the variance in the RCJPS belief. An increase in RCJPS was
predicted by increased dominance (β = .557)), previous prediction (SEBPS, β = .649),
actual learning performance (β = .576), and intelligence (β = .781). All variables were
significant predictors (p < .05).
RQ4. Do demographic factors influence the relationship between emotion and
learning beliefs?
Each of the regression models from RQ1 to RQ3 were re-examined with age, year
in college, ethnicity, and gender. For the LF models, only RCJ LF was influenced by
demographic variables. The new RCJLF model was statistically significant (F(3,99) =
24.19, p < .001) with an R2 = .423, indicating the model accounted for about 42.3% of the
variance in the RCJLF belief. The new model showed an increase in RCJLF was still
associated with previous prediction (SEBLF, β = 1.11) and actual learning performance (β
= .934) while females were associated with an average additional 2.88 point increase in
the number of questions believed to be correct. Therefore, regarding anticipated total
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points correct, males (M = 6.57, SD = 2.61) tended to guess higher on how many
questions that they answered correctly than females (M = 6.08, SD = 2.93); however,
when controlling for differences in prior guess and actual performance, females tended to
guess higher. All variables were significant (p < .001). When gender was included in the
model, positive energy and tiredness were no longer significant predictors.
For the PS models, only FOKPS was modified by a demographic variable, age
(standardized). The new model was statistically significant (F(4,98) = 16.35, p < .001)
with an R2 = .401, indicating the model accounted for about 40.1% of the variance in the
FOKPS belief. For the new model, increased FOKPS was associated with decreased fear
(β = -.145) and increased previous prediction (SEBPS, β = .332) actual learning
performance (β = .154) and age (β = .154). The gender effect seen in RCJLF was not
repeated positive psychology models.
RQ5. Do environmental factors influence the relationship between emotion and
learning beliefs?
Each regression model from RQ1 to RQ4 was tested against competing models
with classroom, time of day, and date included as intervening variables. If time was
restricted to morning versus afternoon sessions, a single, significant model could be
coerced including the variable. Environmental variables were either not significant or
accounted for significantly less variance than the prior models.
As a further examination of the environmental data, t-tests were calculated
(uncorrected) for effects of the room or time of day on the emotion, performance, and
belief variables. Only the effects of room on fear (Basement M = 1.89, SD = 1.96;
Classroom M = 2.96, SD = 3.21; t(79.8) = 2.03 , p = .045 ) and hostility (Basement M =
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1.11, SD = 1.69; Classroom M = 2.18, SD = 2.95; t(76.8) = 2.26, p = .028) were
significant, and only the time of day effects on SEBPS (Morning M = 3.93, SD = .7;
Afternoon M = 3.63, SD = .65; t(47.7) = 2.02 , p = .049) and PS video sum score
(Morning M = 38.3, SD = 5.7; Afternoon M = 35.6, SD = 6.3; t(55.6) = 2.15 , p = .036 )
were significant. There is insufficient evidence against classroom and time of day effects
being more than proxies for more salient variables, such as positivity, regulation, and
negative arousal.
Summary
Demographics and environment were minimally influential in beliefs about
learning performance. It was expected that there would be differential functioning
between the two content types; the difference was present and impacted the influence of
the independent variables across all constructs. As predicted, participants assumed they
would perform better on the positive psychology portion of the study, yet it proved to be
more difficult than the logical fallacies learning session. Evidence suggests group
differences are less influential than content type on belief formation, both before and after
a learning task.
Positive emotion was a consistent predictor across models for SEBs; however,
measures of negative emotion and emotion did not contribute to any model unless
positive emotion was included as a control variable. This may in part been due to the
floor effect and relatively few participants who reported larger scores on the negative
measures, but it was further confounded by the inconsistent effects of the subscales that
made up the negative emotion scales. For example, sadness tended to predict an
increased performance belief while fear tended to predict a diminished one.
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Further, intelligence and emotion regulation were significant contributors to belief
formation, but more so on post-learning beliefs. Dominance has an unexpectedly strong
and limited role in influencing beliefs, but only for the positive psychology learning. It
was also unexpected that the only measure on the emotion scales to directly influence
FOK was fear, and that any effects arising from emotion on FOK or RJC appeared to be
occurring indirectly through the presence of SEB as a predictor. The current study is
unable to distinguish if the relationship between emotional states and post-learning
beliefs is a direct effect or if they have no effect as once learning beliefs are formed
(SEB), the emotional states only serve to maintain the SEB beliefs.

58
Chapter V
Discussion
Summary of Study
The current study examined how beliefs about learning are influenced by emotion
and intervening variables that may influence that relationship. Measures of general
emotion, arousal, regulation, and intelligence were modeled using linear regression to
examine their influence on learning beliefs. The sample consisted of 104 UNM students
attending a class in either EDPY 303 and EDPY 310. Participants were mostly female,
and either Hispanic or White.
Positive and negative emotion, along with arousal, were found to have a strong
relationship to pre-learning belief formation. Post-learning beliefs are most strongly
predicted by pre-learning beliefs and actual test performance. Fear can influence relative
beliefs while dominance is more strongly associated with absolute estimates of
performance. Intelligence and distress tolerance are also associated with post-learning
beliefs, but their influence appears to be dependent on content type.
Multiple linear regression models suggest a complex relationship between how
people perceive learning content and emotional states influences how they form beliefs
about their expected and reflective performance. For material that was perceived as more
difficult (logical fallacies), higher levels of emotion regulation and intelligence were
associated with increased performance beliefs, but not with material that was perceived
as easier (positive psychology). However, after participants experienced a greater-thanexpected challenge on the positive psychology task, individual’s absolute reflective
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judgment beliefs became influenced by intelligence and dominance, indicating it is
possible an unconscious change in strategy occurred.
RQ1: Are emotions associated with how people predict their ability to perform a
learning task (SEB)?
Measures of emotion and arousal accounted for about ¼ of the variance in
learning belief predictions (LF  21.9 %; PS  26.4%). SEB was positively associated
with measures of positive emotion; however, there was a more complex relationship
between negative emotion and type of arousal. Negative emotion did not have a
significant effect alone, and it was poorly distributed. In addition, individual components
of negative emotion had inconsistent effects.
For predicting both learning fallacy and positive psychology learning outcomes,
higher positive emotion was associated with predicting a better learning outcome, as was
sadness, and fatigue. However, fear and tiredness were associated with lower learning
predictions. For positive psychology, both negative arousal and dominance were
associated with higher belief predictions, but they were not predictors for SEBLF.
Measuring emotion or arousal as a spectrum along a single dimension (as was
done with the SAMS assessment) was not a significant predictor of learning beliefs.
Study outcome models suggest negative emotion and arousal appear to have an influence
on SEB, but that relationship is dependent on the source and subtype for each construct.
Most salient was the impact of arousal level. Both positive and negative forms of arousal
were consistently associated with learner beliefs.
The models support the hypothesis that different strategies may be used for
different content types. Variables present in both models had similar effect size and
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direction; however, the models varied as to predictors. Negative emotion measures were
sufficiently skewed and with a substantial floor effect that suggests there were
insufficient levels of negative emotion within the study group to accurately report on the
effects of negative emotion.
RQ2: Are emotions associated with how learners believe they have performed on a
learning task (FOK and RCJ)?
Participants were asked about how well they believed they had done on logical
fallacies and positive psychology learning tasks. They were asked to estimate how well
they had done relative to others (FOK) and by total number of correct questions (RCJ).
Participants' FOK was predicted by fear, pre-learning belief, and actual performance
regardless of content topic, and accounting for about 36% of total FOK variance. Fear
was measured as a general state before assessment and was not a product of the learning
event itself.
When performance belief was measured as an absolute value (estimated number
correct, RCJ), predictor variables were not consistent for the two content types. SEB and
actual performance were significant predictors regardless of content, but the RCJ for the
logical fallacies content, believed to be more difficult, was associated with positive
energy and tiredness, while the positive psychology content belief was better modeled by
a positive association with dominance. It appears that the positive psychology content,
which was generally found to be harder than expected, appears to have caused learners to
fall back on their dominance, or feelings of being in control to inform them on how well
they had done on the learning task.
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Actual performance predicting both FOK and RCJ reflected a moderate
relationship between performance and belief. This relationship suggests that participants
generally possessed a moderate level of metacognitive awareness and realistic evaluation
of their performance. Participants had some sense of how well they performed, but their
post-learning beliefs were still influenced by additional study variables such as initial
performance belief and emotional state.
RQ3: Are distress tolerance or intelligence intervening variables in the relationship
between emotion or arousal and learning beliefs?
Emotion regulation and intelligence were significant predictors with pre-learning
beliefs for the logical fallacies content, but not the positive psychology content.
Intelligence was positively associated with SEBLF while emotion regulation had an
interaction with positive emotion. Both factors suggest a level of metacognitive
awareness as reinforced by prior learning experience. There was insufficient evidence
for emotion regulation interacting with negative emotion measures, and neither
intelligence nor emotion regulation influenced post-learning beliefs.
Emotion regulation failed to contribute to any learning belief model for the
positive psychology content. Intelligence predicted RCJ PS, but there was no evidence to
support its influence in SEBPS or FOKPS. The inconsistencies in models may indicate a
weakness in the data, but it may also indicate a difference in how perceived difficulty
influences belief development. For material that is perceived to be less difficult, the
metacognitive strategy from emotion regulation and intelligence were not influential on
SEB learning belief development.
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RQ4: Do demographic factors influence the relationship between emotion and
learning beliefs?
The effects of gender and age were inconsistent. While gender replaced positive
energy and tiredness in the RCJLF model, it failed to contribute to any additional models.
Age had a positive association with post-learning outcomes for positive psychology, but
not logical fallacy learning beliefs. There was no a priori evidence for these
demographic relationships and may have been an artifact of random variance. The
gender variable could have been a proxy for other variables specific to the small male
sample in the study. Age could be an intervening variable for material that was believed
to be easy but wasn’t. Age may have had a dampening effect, insulating a student’s postlearning beliefs.
RQ5: Do environmental factors influence the relationship between emotion and
learning beliefs?
There was insufficient evidence that models of learning belief development based
on emotion, arousal, dominance, and regulation have additional variance accounted for
by adding time of day or learning environment to the model. It would be expected with
additional environments or more extreme learning times would not be significant
contributors once current model variables were included; however, additional studies
would be required to confirm. Time of day and environment may have a direct effect, but
their effects are best understood as proxies for emotion and arousal variables.
Findings and Implications
Study outcomes suggest support for the hypothesis that positive emotion causes
people to overestimate how well they will perform a learning assessment. Similarly,
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arousal measures such as tiredness predicted both how well individuals believed they
would do and how well they had performed. This finding suggests the outcomes may
support an approach versus withdraw theoretical basis for belief formation. Approach
versus withdrawal effects of the constructs may account for the opposite effects found
within negative emotion and arousal constructs. The positive association with sadness
and accuracy could be linked to the somewhat controversial view that depression tends to
make people more realistic in their estimates.
The influence of fear and dominance on post-assessment beliefs appear to reflect
a possible recency effect on post-assessment processing. The extent to which an
individual was feeling in control and successful in recent experience generally appears to
have been applied to the specific learning contexts. This may indicate a general effect
from self-confidence on post-learning beliefs.
The study findings suggest emotional states and levels of arousal directly
influence learning beliefs. These beliefs, as part of student metacognitive processing,
may have an undesirable impact on student behavior. If students are made aware of these
relationships and given tools to more accurately monitor their progress, the negative
impacts could be decreased. This cycle can be most clearly seen in mathematics phobias,
where students can underestimate their ability, and, despite a successful test, believe they
are performing poorly, thereby creating a chronic state of low SEBs based on emotional
valence rather than objective measurement.
Study outcomes are best predicted by cognitive models and research that include
bottom-up processing where emotions are the driving cues in rapid, heuristic thinking (de
Waal & Ferrari, 2010; Dolcos, Iordan, & Dolcos, 2011b; Immordino-Yang & Damasio,
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2007; Phelps & Sharot, 2008). This supports Koriat’s (1997) hypothesis that postlearning beliefs are strongly formed from simple heuristic. Koriat calls these emotion
based beliefs noetic feelings, and Dokic ( 2012, p. 302) later calls noetic feelings the
“seeds of self-knowledge.” It appears then that the seeds of self-knowledge when
learning may be sown with speed rather than accuracy.
While Bandura (1997; 2010) suggests physiological states can influence selfefficacy, the researcher of the current study suggests the findings for a complex
relationship between negative arousal and belief development indicate that physiological
state is insufficient to account for this relationship. It appears that emotion, or the
cognitive interpretation of the physiological state, is a better predictor of self-efficacy
belief development. This finding supports previous research on emotion and selfefficacy, as does the positive association of positive emotion and self-efficacy (Kavanagh
& Bower. 1985). However, current findings diverge from previous research by
suggesting a more complex relationship between negative emotions and self-efficacy than
has previously been considered. Further, the finding that self-efficacy is an emotiondriven heuristic, may suggest the mechanisms of SEB are similar to FOK and RCJ.
Further research is required to examine the extent to which these constructs function
similarly and where the points of divergence are.
The Dunning-Kruger effect suggests individuals with the lowest ability are the
worst at estimating their ability (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). If the learning beliefs
informing metacognitive monitoring are heuristics driven by emotion, then those with the
lowest ability may be at increased risk for emotional influence as they are less capable of
reflectively monitoring when the accuracy of their estimates have deviated from objective
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assessment. Considering the tenacity that an individual tends to trust their beliefs once
formed (Loftus, 1975), and it is important researchers and practitioners developing an
intervention to improve objective, heuristic thinking, especially when learning novel
skills or with individuals with low ability.
Limitations
The current study had multiple limiting factors, primarily resulting from time
limitations and the sample, with sample limitations creating the most obvious concern.
Participants were all university students, taking the same courses. Therefore, it was
limited to adults who were in or interested in an education or services-related field.
While any narrow sample raises concerns, the present sample may have additional
influences close to the current study, such as increased metacognitive awareness and selfregulation. The sample limitation particularly raises concerns about the generalizability
of outcomes.
The limited window in which the study needed to occur (two hours per session)
created three additional factors that significantly limited the study. The APM assessment
the videos consumed most of the allotted two hours for the study. Had time been less of
an issue, additional steps could have been taken to improve the overall validity and
generalizability of the outcomes. Specifically, qualitative assessments could have
improved the interpretability of outcomes.
The first factor is in regard to the assessments. FOK and RCJ assessments are
best performed when follow-up question such as “which questions specifically do you
believe you missed” and “how do you feel these questions evaluated your understanding
of the material.” This line of questioning would provide additional insight into how the
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readers felt about their performance and possibly reveal emotion-based processing that is
not easily assessed with Likert scale items. However, as noted by Schraw (2009), no
single method or approach to measuring metacognitive monitoring has proven sufficient
to form a best practices standard.
The self-efficacy assessments were only a single question in each category.
Specific assessments and recommendations for self-efficacy exist in the literature
(Pajares, 1996; Pajares, Hartley, & Valieante, 2001). While the recommendation of using
a Likert type scale was followed, the use of more questions and those with previously
demonstrated psychometric properties would offer an overall stronger assessment and
strengthen the ability to draw conclusions from the outcomes.
The second factor was the instructional content. Learning material was presented
only as brief videos. To apply outcomes to a general theory of learning, additional
features such as classroom interactions, peer discussions, reading, and self-study would
need to be included. Similarly, the two content pieces themselves were of a similar type
and may not accurately reflect the same processes occurring in different subjects, such as
mathematics or art. The method and similarity of instructional delivery raises concerns
about the generalizability of study outcomes.
The third, time-limited factor was longitudinal effects and salient behaviors
resulting from beliefs formed by emotional states. It appears there is evidence that
emotional state influences belief formation; however, a longitudinal study that examined
the evidence for these beliefs in student behavior would provide stronger evidence and
implications. For example, if a student maintained a positive mood state over a week
directly influencing their beliefs in their content understanding, such a belief may have
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implications for how much, or how little, the student spends studying in the coming
weekend.
Future Research
There are several mood and emotion inducing techniques that have been used
successfully in psychology research, spanning multiple paradigms of emotional states
(Martin, 1990). There have even been some recent advances in the area using virtual
reality (VR) to induce temporary states of emotion needed for research outcomes
(Felnhofer et al., 2015). By eliciting the desired moot states with different individuals,
especially at multiple data collection points, a far greater level of analysis could occur.
Such an approach would allow for inter-individual differences to be examined and
compared across individuals.
Many of the limiting factors of the current study could be addressed by a
longitudinal study that followed students across multiple grade levels as they progressed
through a semester. This approach would allow for multiple emotional states for each
individual while looking at performance across multiple subjects. In addition to greater
ecological validity, such a study would likely provide more meaningful and domain
specific measures of effect size.
Lastly, a better understanding of intervening variables could provide greater
insight into possible mechanisms of both belief formation as well as possible actions of
remediation. Mindfulness is a well-studied construct directly linked to metacognitive
practices and behavioral outcomes from emotional states (Bishop et al., 2004). In
addition to being an intervening variable, mindfulness could provide an approach for
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students to learn to decrease their awareness of their own internal processes and decrease
unwanted effects from strong emotional states when dealing with learning beliefs.
An additional focus for intervening variables could be secondary effects of
psychological illness. Behaviors such as ruminating could be examined for effects
arising from anxiety and depression, conditions which have strong links to
metacognition, behavior, and belief formation, including SEBs (Maciejewski, Prigerson,
& Mazure, 2000; Martocchio, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Either controlling for
those factors, or more richly, following individuals with both acute and chronic anxiety
related or depressive conditions may provide additional insights into mechanisms of
actions. Additional insights may even be gained through a case study approach that
examined individual narratives to determine successful strategies employed by students
suffering from conditions such Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) as they deal with
the impacts of powerful emotional states in relation to their academic beliefs and
behaviors.
Conclusion
Despite the limitations of the current study, it begins to fill a gap in the literature
on the relationship between emotional states and the formation of learning beliefs. While
experienced educators may have an instinct toward much of what is reflected in this
study, the study provides research support to those beliefs. The study controlled for key
variables that educators are likely to have personal beliefs and experiences with
(intelligence, demographics, emotion regulation), and provides additional support for
teaching students metacognitive skills and strategies for improving their learning.
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Appendix A
Demographics and self-efficacy beliefs questionnaire
What year were you born? ___________
Circle One:
What is your gender: Male
Academic progress:

Female

Freshman

Sophomore

Junior

Senior

What is your ethnicity:
Hispanic or Latino
White

Asian

Black or African American
Pacific Islander

Native American

Other

After watching two videos, one on logic and the other on positive psychology, how well do you
think you would do on a questionnaire checking your understanding of the content, compared to
others?
Questionnaire on a video explaining Logical Fallacies
1
Far worse than others

2
Slightly worse

3
About the same

4
slightly better

5
Much better than others

Questionnaire on a video discussing Positive Psychology
1
Far worse than others

2
Slightly worse

3
About the same

4
slightly better

5
Much better than others
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Appendix B
Knowledge & Belief Assessments

Logical Fallacies
Circle the best answer
1. The statement “He is a wealthy Harvard professor; he can’t really understand what it is
like to be poor” is most likely an example of:
A. Logical conclusion
B. False Dichotomy
C. Hasty Generalization
D. Ad Hominem
E. The Non Sequitur
2. The statement “We all know what is best for our school, it is time to take action” is most
likely an example of:
A. False Dichotomy
B. Goal oriented beliefs
C. Hasty Generalization
D. Consensus based Conclusion
E. Ad Hominem
3. Opinions expressed as facts and not based on evidence is most likely:
A. Democratic speech
B. False Dichotomy
C. Hasty Generalization
D. Ad Hominem
E. Faulty Analogy
4. “You have to vote in the election or you do not support Democracy” is an example of:
A. Deductive logic
B. False Dichotomy
C. Inductive reasoning
D. Hasty Generalization
E. Ad Hominem
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5. “Marijuana is a gateway drug” is an example of which fallacy:
A. False Analogy
B. False Dichotomy
C. Slippery Slope
D. Hasty Generalization
E. Ad Hominem
6. Attacking someone based on their membership in a religion or political association is:
A. Circular Reasoning
B. False Dichotomy
C. Slippery Slope
D. Hasty Generalization
E. Ad Hominem
7. “The King’s word is diving because he was appointed by the gods as their voice” is
which type of logical fallacy:
A. False Analogy
B. Circular reasoning
C. Red herring
D. Hasty Generalization
E. Ad Hominem
8. “Everyone is going to go to Florida for spring break so that is the only place you should
go” is best fit to which logical fallacy:
A. False Analogy
B. Bandwagon Fallacy
C. Red herring
D. Hasty Generalization
E. False Dichotomy
9. “America, love it or leave it” is which type of logical fallacy:
A. False Analogy
B. False Dichotomy
C. Slippery Slope
D. Hasty Generalization
E. Ad Hominem
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10. “We had 30 inches of snow last month, obviously global warming isn’t real” is which
type of logical fallacy:
A. The non Sequitur
B. False Dichotomy
C. Slippery Slope
D. The Relativist Fallacy
E. Ad Hominem

11. Person one says “We are losing our personal freedoms and rights to privacy.” Person two
responds with: “We are under terrorist threat; we can’t afford to worry about personal
rights.” What type of fallacy is person two using?
A. Red Herring
B. False Dichotomy
C. Slippery Slope
D. The Relativist Fallacy
E. Ad Hominem
12. “Those who can’t do, teach” is an example of which fallacy?
A. Hasty Generalization
B. False Dichotomy
C. Slippery Slope
D. The Relativist Fallacy
E. Ad Hominem
13. “If we have background checks for guns, next we will lose our rights to own guns
entirely” is an example of which fallacy?
A. False Analogy
B. False Dichotomy
C. Slippery Slope
D. The Relativist Fallacy
E. ad Hominem
14. “We had 30 inches of snow last month, obviously global warming isn’t real” is which
type of logical fallacy:
A. False Analogy
B. False Dichotomy
C. Slippery Slope
D. The Relativist Fallacy
E. Ad Hominem
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15. Superstitions are an example of what logical fallacy?
A. False Analogy
B. Hasty Generalization
C. Slippery Slope
D. The Relativist Fallacy
E. Ad Hominem

Out of the 15 questions that were asked, how many do you believe you answered
correctly? ___________
How well did you understand the content of Logical Fallacies video?
Circle One: Not at all

Poorly

Average

Well

Very Well

92
Appendix C
Knowledge & Belief Assessment – Logical Fallacies

Positive Psychology
For each question, circle ALL that are true
1.

Why did Dr. Seligman say the state of Psychology was “Good”
a. We developed a disease model of psychology
b. We have become better at measuring ways of testing psychological illness
c. We have developed drugs to treat some psychological illnesses
d. Psychology emphasized happiness

2. Why did Dr. Seligman say the state of Psychology was “Not Good”
a. Psychology didn’t focus on the average or healthy person
b. Psychology developed disease models
c. We have developed drugs to treat some psychological illnesses
d. To many resources being invested on happiness instead of illness
3. Identify all that are recognized as being happy lives:
a. A pleasant life, maximizing positive emotion
b. A life of hard work
c. A life lived engaged, invoking flow frequently
d. A life of meaning
4. Psychology research shows that interventions are limited in improving a life lived based
on seeking excitement and fun because:
a. Pursuing fun means you aren’t pursuing meaning
b. There are genetic limitations on what you experiencing as pleasure
c. We habituate to pleasure
d. Pursuing fun comes at the cost of hard work
5. Eudemonia, as used in the video, is best described as:
a. Satisfaction
b. Flow
c. Flourishing
d. Positive emotions
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6. Flow means you are experiencing
a. Stopped time
b. Engagement
c. Joy
d. Positive emotions
7. Flow means you are experiencing
a. Stopped time
b. Engagement
c. Joy
d. Positive emotions
8.

People who live meaningful lives have in common that they:
a. They have a purpose to their life
b. They know their future occupations
c. Keep a written journal of their plans
d. They use their character strengths in their daily lives

9. What increases happy emotions and pleasure experiences
a. Practicing savoring
b. Developing meaning
c. Entering into Flow states
d. Mindfulness
10. Doing a “gratitude visit” is an intervention for:
a. Hedonic Pleasure
b. Flow
c. Life satisfaction
d. Increased Meaning
11. The disease model refers to
a. Psychology has learned to classify mental illnesses
b. Psychology that focuses on relieving misery
c. Improving happiness decreases disease
d. A focus on what is wrong with people without examining living a better life
12. Dr. Seligman felt that technology and entertainment can:
a. Increase mental illness
b. Distract us from living a good life
c. Can be designed to improve flow and meaning
d. Will improve diagnosis of psychological illnesses
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13. With regard to living a good life, seeking positive emotion and pleasure
a. Distracts us from living a good life
b. Contributes the most to a good life when there is meaning in life
c. Is the opposite of Flow
d. Is the same as Flow
14. Positive Psychology seeks to:
a. Cure mental illness
b. Decrease anxiety and depression
c. Study and identify what makes for a life well lived
d. Seeks to find and teach interventions that make life more enjoyable
15. The speaker directs the viewer to a website where you can take a psychology assessment
to tell you about what?
a. Your personal character strengths
b. Where you fit in a disease model
c. Your current level of happiness
d. If you are living a good life

Out of the 15 questions that were asked, how many do you believe you answered
correctly? ___________

How well did you understand the content of the Positive Psychology video?
Circle One: Not at all

Poorly

Average

Well

Very Well
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Appendix D
PANAS-X
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Appendix E
SAM
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Appendix F
4DMS

Active
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Calm
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Aggravated
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Exhausted
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Energetic
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Peaceful
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Agitated
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Fatigued
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely
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Lively
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Relaxed
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Hostile
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Tired
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Vigorous
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Serene
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Irritable
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Weary
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely
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Tranquil
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Upset
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Worn out
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely

Uptight
To what extent have you felt this way generally across all situations over the past six months?
Very slightly or not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely
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Appendix G
DTS
Please rate each item by selecting one of the five answers for each question. Please
answer each statement by circling the number that best applies to you.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Feeling distressed or upset is
unbearable to me.
When I feel distressed or upset, all I
can think about is how bad I feel.
I can’t handle feeling distressed or
upset.
My feelings of distress are so intense
that they completely take over.
There’s nothing worse than feeling
distressed or upset.
My feelings of distress or being upset
are just an acceptable par of life.
I can tolerate being distressed or upset
as well as most people.
My feelings of distress or being upset
are not acceptable.
I’ll do anything to avoid feeling
distressed or upset.
Other people seem to be able to
tolerate feeling distressed or upset
better than I can.
Being distressed or upset is always a
major ordeal for me.
I am ashamed of myself when I feel
distressed or upset.
My feelings of distress or being upset
scare me.
I’ll do anything to stop feeling
distressed or upset.
When I feel distressed or upset, I must
do something about it immediately.
When I feel distressed or upset, I
cannot help but concentrate on how
bad the distress actually feels.

Strongly
Disagree
1

Mildly
Disagree
2

Feel
Mildly
Neutral Agree
3
4

Strongly
Agree
5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

